• Marlies Glasius is a Lecturer in Global Politics at the LSE, and author of The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement. She has written numerous articles on global civil society and is one of the founding editors of the Global Civil Society Yearbook. Her current research interests include the International Criminal Court and economic and social rights.
Introduction
The euphoria which emerged in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the spread of democratic regimes has been replaced in recent years by a somber backlash against civil society on many levels and fronts 1 . This has particularly intensified following the attacks on September 11 and the ensuing global war on terror, which is increasingly being referred to as the 'long war' on terror (LWOT).
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The War has crystallized many pre-existing questions around civil society.
Within the context of LWOT we can observe a spectrum of phenomena which point to a backlash. These range from at the one end the renewed, systematic repression of civil society in authoritarian states and 'managed democracies' 3 (Colton and McFaul 2003) to at the other end a more general querying of the probity of civil society organizations, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 4 The claims of NGOs to representativeness, comparative effectiveness, to operating democratically and their proximity to their constituencies/clients are being challenged not only by governments but also by social movements and non-NGO civil society organizations.
In the meantime donor agencies are attempting to 'tidy up' their relations with civil society organizations through better-managed partnership arrangements, whilst the UN is promoting 'disciplined networks' (United Nations 2004: 32) The paper begins by examining the overt backlash against civil society organizations, and in particular NGOs receiving foreign funding, that is emerging in authoritarian regimes and reluctant or 'managed' democracies such as China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Nigeria. It then considers the more implicit forms of backlash such as the disciplining and taming of civil society, which began in the late 1990s but have intensified in the context of LWOT. We consider how the LWOT has implications for civil societies not just in new or emerging democracies but also in older, more established democratic states. We examine how this multi-layered backlash is manifested and how it is a product of local political developments as well as the policies, discourses, and practices of the LWOT. Furthermore, we consider how concerted efforts at 'building civil society' by development agencies from the late 1980s onwards have had unintended consequences. These include repression from host states that are increasingly suspicious of civil society as well as criticism from grassroots groups and social movements toward NGOs which consider the latter as having been co-opted by development agencies.
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The Rise and Fall of an Ideal
Civil society was not used as an analytic concept or as a mobilizing discourse 25 years ago. It was dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe who revitalized the concept of civil society in the 1980s to express their resistance to authoritarian rule and their aspirations for a more democratic polity with a continued role for state regulation.
The concept of civil society soon became a rallying cry against oppressive regimes in Latin America, the Soviet Union and Africa. Development agencies gradually absorbed and appropriated the idea of civil society into their discourses and policies subsequently making it a central part of their aid programmes to developing and transition countries.
Donors embraced the idea of civil society development as critical to democratization, good governance, and development. Their euphoria for civil society arose out of a combination of factors. These included the growing disillusion of Western governments and donors with state-led development in the newly independent post-colonial states, the ascendancy of the neoliberal paradigm of New Public Management which supported the roll-back of the state and the privatization of social service delivery, and the growing emphasis on democracy promotion in US foreign policy which advocated greater civic participation and good governance. In this context civil society promotion became a new mantra in both aid and diplomatic circles (Ottaway and Carothers 1998: 6) as the concept became part of everyday donor currency. Donor agencies began setting-up special civil society units, creating civil society liaison positions, and establishing programmes to strengthen civil society
The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror -Jude Howell, Armine Ishkanian, Ebenezer Obadare, Hakan Seckinelgin, and Marlies Glasius (Howell and Pearce 2002) . In doing so they defined civil society to include a larger array of organizations such as trades unions, professional associations, faith-based groups, media than just NGOs, though in practice they continued to work mainly with NGOs. In many transition and developing countries, where the infusion of donor funding led to an unprecedented growth in the numbers of NGOs, civil society came to be locally equated with the development and growth of NGOs.
Although the late 1980s and the 1990s were a honeymoon period for civil society and the aid industry, where civil society seemed to promise democratization and an alternative to the state and the market, this situation would not last long. 
Overt Backlash: Pressure from 'Managed' Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes on Civil Society
In the wake of the 'color' revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan,
Western support for civil society in these countries began attracting criticism from governments throughout the former Soviet states and led to the adoption of laws restricting NGO activity as well as more insidious forms of repression. The most notable example is that of Russia where in direct response to the color revolutions and using the language of LWOT the Russian Duma passed a bill that promises to greatly legislation that is similar to the Russian bill which will institute strict guidelines on the work of foreign and domestic NGOs (RFE/RL 13/9/05). In Tajikistan, a country which is highly dependent on foreign aid, the government is also proposing a law to regulate and monitor NGOs because of a growing concern over the political activities of NGOs (Pylenko 2006) . Even in Kyrgyzstan, which had been considered one of the more democratic of the Central Asian states and which experienced its own color and where democracy may flourish. While it remains to be seen how these events will develop in coming years, the prognosis is not very optimistic.
Implicit Backlash: Reining in and Rethinking the Usefulness of Civil Society
Unlike the overt backlash in which civil society is monitored, demonized and repressed, there has been a less obvious, but nonetheless insidious form of backlash against civil society which can be observed in certain donor policies and practices that began in the late 1990s and are intensifying in the post September 11 context. In their effort to promote the development of civil society and to improve the effectiveness and accountability of civil society organizations, donor organizations have implemented certain policies and practices, such as an emphasis on coordinated and centralized aid delivery, the funding of certain civil society organizations over others, and a growing focus on technical service delivery. The efforts of coordination and disciplined networking, which are aimed at improving aid delivery and also the advocacy work of CSOs, are to some extent informed by the needs of international actors to focus their access points within countries and to minimize transaction costs.
The policies and practices have inadvertently restricted the diversity of civil society by putting an emphasis on the technical service delivery functions of civil society organizations at the expense of their potential emancipatory and political roles. These policies and practices present an implicit backlash that is less obvious and more tempered than the manifestations described in the previous section.
For instance, while on the one hand donors were trying to support the development of civil society and the growth of democracy, on the other hand they were also attempting to if not regulate, then at least to monitor and evaluate what CSOs were doing and how they were doing it in an effort to ensure that money was being
The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror -Jude Howell, Armine Ishkanian, Ebenezer Obadare, Hakan Seckinelgin, and Marlies Glasius well spent and that the objectives agreed upon were being met. With these important and valid concerns over accountability and effectiveness, however, a tendency emerged among donors to work with a limited number of organizations as the representatives of civil society in a given context. Donors particularly funded those organizations that were seen as amenable to regulation. Grants were repeatedly given to those organizations that had proven their ability to follow procedures and reporting requirements established by donors while newer, smaller, less recognized, and more politically active organizations were left without funds. Organizations that were able to communicate using the language and discourses current amongst donors were also more likely to be successful in their grant applications.
More worrying for civil society actors involved in development is the shift in donor aid policies towards budget support, whereby funds are given directly to national governments or particular sectors of government. This shift, which will reduce the amount of direct funding from donors to CSOs, is poignantly exemplified in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 7 The Declaration refers to civil society only once throughout the entire document and only then it is to urge the governments of recipient countries to co-ordinate aid at all levels and to encourage the participation of civil society in development initiatives (2005: 3). NGOs, which in the 1990s were active in all forms of development work are not even mentioned once in the ten page Declaration. The Declaration is an indication that donors are beginning to move away from their focus on civil society and are returning to a policy of providing direct aid to governments. The latter policy had been abandoned in the late 1980s following concerns among donors that the governments of developing countries were too corrupt and inefficient to promote development. The drive to (re)centralize
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The case of civil society involvement in HIV/AIDS policies in Africa is an area where some of the policies mentioned earlier, such as coordination and technical service delivery, have been put into practice. First, the shift in approach from framing HIV/AIDS as a disease requiring medical and social solutions to an emergency requiring immediate attention has affected the work of CSOs in HIV/AIDS in Africa.
This shift has gradually become instrumental in turning civil society activism into an apolitical service delivery tool because the logic of emergency suggested that immediate needs should take precedence over larger structural and political issues.
Questions about the rights of the people living with the disease, their access to resources, the structural dimensions of poverty, and related issues came to be seen as While it remains to be seen whether this new drive toward coordination and harmonization will lead to more effective aid delivery and development programmes, one thing which is clear is that some of these coordination and disciplining efforts are threatening to stifle the expression of diverse voices within civil society. Yet diversity and debate are essential elements of deliberative democracy. As Iris Marion Young puts it, 'Confrontation with different perspectives, interests and cultural meanings teaches individuals the partiality of their own, and reveals to them their own experience as perspectival ' (1997: 403) . From a policy perspective, such listening 'across differences', Young maintains, allows people to understand something about the ways that policies affect others that are differently situated.
Finally, the tendencies to support particular organizations, attempts at coordinating civil society and focusing on technical rather than political and structural issues, have in turn led to another, related, backlash that has emerged from the grassroots, smaller organizations and social movements. Given the fact that many NGOs in developing and transition countries are not membership organizations and are largely reliant on foreign funding, they often do not enjoy broad based support from within their communities. Very often smaller, grassroots organizations and social movements view the larger, well-funded NGOs as being donor-driven, Westernoriented, self-serving organizations that are far more accountable to foreign donors than their local communities and beneficiaries. Subsequently, many organizations that are consistently awarded grants have come to be seen as Western 'pawns' or 'agents'
by the local press and public. This has meant that as the pressure from governments has increased, many NGOs in developing and transition countries now find themselves between a rock and a hard place in that as they are increasingly encountering repression from their governments, they are simultaneously not receiving support from their communities.
Conclusion
Having The general querying of civil society and the passage of anti-terror legislation is creating a chill factor which leads to self-censorship among civil society organizations and greater conservatism, regulation, and oversight from donors. Obviously some regulation and accountability is important for ensuring the probity of CSOs and is indeed welcomed by CSOs. However, too much control threatens to stifle healthy debate and lead to fear, alienation, and self-censorship, which are all antithetical to democratic governance. What is most worrying is that these tendencies are not just occurring in 'managed' democracies or authoritarian states, but that they are occurring in some of the developed democracies as well such as the UK and USA. Even a civil society haven such as the UN has begun to use the discourse of 'disciplining' and 'regulating' civil society. If civil society is to retain its emancipatory dimension and its role in deliberating on the values governing society, it will need to respond
